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Abstract: Hobbes is known for bridging natural and political philosophy, but less attention has been given to how 
this distinguishes the Hobbesian conception of the self from individualist strands of liberalism: First, Hobbes’s 
determinism suggests a conception of the self in which externalities determine the will and what the self is at 
every moment. Second, there is no stable conception of the self because externalities keep it in a constant state of 
flux. The metaphysical underpinnings of his project downplay the notion of a purely individualistic conception of 
the self, pointing to a positivist theory of criminology relying upon external forces. This theory is especially 
prescient with respect to twentieth century variants of positivism that focus upon how social organization affects 
personality. In a sense, then, modern criminological theory is indebted to Hobbes’s focus upon the connections 
between externalities and the self—a focus that illuminates new ways of viewing responsibility and accountability.  
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The political philosophy of Thomas Hobbes has become intertwined with a variant of liberalism 
associated with an exceedingly individualistic conception of the self.1 To put it less anachronistically, 
one might describe this as a conception of the psychological mechanisms of personal identity – though 
“self” may be used as shorthand. Although it is an imprecise conception, the idea is roughly that one’s 
volition may be imposed on the world unimpeded by externalities. It is easy to see how Hobbes’s 
political philosophy came to be associated with this view. With some obvious justification, Hobbes’s 
political theory is typically set against the backdrop of a form of psychological egoism that interprets 
one’s conceptual framework as mere individual preference.2 For example, Hobbes’s state of nature (or 
“the condition of mere nature”) can seem to suggest a bare subject from whom the multitude of personal, 
institutional, and cultural influences may be stripped, leaving behind a subject concerned solely with 
self-interest. It is in part this picture of the self that allows Hobbes to derive his institutional political 
principles. In some respects, this picture is undeniably accurate because Hobbes promotes it 
unambiguously. But these superficial aspects of Hobbes’s political philosophy do not tell the whole 
story. It is also the metaphysical underpinning of Hobbes’s systematic project that is vital to his 
conception of the self in both natural and political philosophy.3 This paper examines how Hobbes’s 
account of the metaphysics of causation is at odds with the conception of a detached self that is often 
associated with his political theory. The examination of this issue will lead to some interesting 
conclusions, including a novel interpretation of Hobbes’s theory of criminology that situates him closer 
to the positivist school. 
 Hobbes is typically viewed as a forerunner of the “classical school” of criminology, which justifies 
punishment based upon the presumption that it deters rational agents who act freely.4 The positivist 
school manifests itself in a variety of forms, but generally responds to the classical school with 
“scientific” (or positive) explanations (e.g., social) of crime.5 It is easy to see why Hobbes is more 
closely associated with the classical school. Hobbes’s conception of human beings as largely egoistic, 
equal, and rational lays the groundwork for social contract (or “covenant”) theory (with an enforcer to 
protect one’s self-interest) and the classical school’s justification for punishment.6 Although this paper 
does not suggest that the standard view should be upended, it does show how it needs to be reoriented. 
Before reaching this payoff, though, a fair amount of legwork must be conducted regarding the 
relationship between Hobbes’s political philosophy and his natural philosophy. The idea that Hobbes’s 
political philosophy is grounded broadly in natural philosophy is of course not new.7 The focus here 
will thus be on a narrower topic: the extent to which Hobbes’s stance on causation and determinism 
suggests a more diverse conception of the self than the exceedingly individualistic conception typically 
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associated with his philosophy. The goal, then, is to show how Hobbes’s position on causation sheds 
light on a more multidimensional and interconnected view of the self .   
 Recent work by Sharon Lloyd, Samantha Frost, and others is suggestive of this goal, particularly 
Lloyd’s account of “transcendent interests” in Hobbes’s work and Frost’s account of how Hobbes’s 
materialism implies a self that is “always embedded in and a part of a collective.”8 This paper builds 
upon such conceptions of the Hobbesian self, while presenting a novel argument centered on two 
themes: (1) Hobbes’s determinism opposes a conception of the self from which one may detach all 
externalities because those externalities necessarily determine the will and what the self is at any given 
moment, and (2) there is no stable conception of the self that persists because the externalities at play 
on a subject keep the self in a constant state of flux. The resulting conclusion is that Hobbes’s political 
philosophy – as based upon his natural philosophy – situates his criminological theory more closely to 
the positivist school, which may illuminate new ways of viewing responsibility and accountability. 
 
Classical and Positivist Criminology, Rational and Material Agency 
 
Given that Hobbes is often viewed as an early representative of the classical school of criminology, it 
is helpful to lay the groundwork with a very brief history of that school and its evolution in 
contemporary political philosophy – as well as a brief comparison with the positivist school. This will 
help show that while Hobbes’s work is undoubtedly tied to the former, it also includes important 
connections to the latter.  
 
Classical Criminology and the Liberal Tradition 
 
“Criminology” typically refers the study of crime, the causes of crime, and the way that a polity treats 
(and should treat) offenders. Contemporary criminology also includes specific theories of criminal 
behavior, law, and justice – such as “strain” (the theory that limited legitimate economic opportunity in 
societies that value economic success leads people to commit crimes) and “social disorganization” (the 
theory that one’s locale affects one’s criminal proclivities given that some communities are unable to 
come together to solve problems). “Classical” criminology is associated with the Enlightenment of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries because it emphasizes human reason, value, and agency. The 
emphasis on such values can be contrasted with earlier and harsher treatment of offenders that was 
based upon arbitrary state action and authority. Accordingly, a central component of the classical school 
is the relationship between persons and the state given one’s capacity to be party to the social contract. 
In other words, persons who rationally and voluntarily submit to state authority – in exchange for certain 
common goods from the state – are subject to punishment if they break the state’s rules grounded by 
the social contract. Prominent classical theorists include Jeremy Bentham and Cesare Beccaria. Hobbes 
is included among this group because the classical school emphasizes one’s criminal responsibility 
given one’s rationality and freedom to engage in right and wrong acts. 
 Let us consider how the classical model fits in with contemporary theories of justice in the liberal 
tradition. Theories of justice in the liberal tradition often begin with an assumption (some would call it 
a platitude) that all persons have the capacity to be free and equal. This pre-political conception of 
persons extends through the Enlightenment, famously forming the foundation for many modern states 
and serving as the basis of prominent contemporary theories of justice. As I have noted elsewhere, “the 
rudiments of this idea can be grasped by examining how desert-based legal institutions account for 
actions and accompanying mental states with an explanation that is based upon a conception of the 
person as having the capacity […] for these natural properties (rather than an explanation based upon 
any particular metaphysical conception).”9 Rawls puts it this way: “in virtue of their two moral powers 
(a capacity for a sense of justice and for a conception of the good) and the powers of reason (of 
judgment, thought, and inference connected with these powers) persons are free.”10 Accordingly, if the 
state ascribes to persons the capacity to act voluntarily, the upshot is that it would be morally wrong for 
the state to hold one responsible for acts that do not conform to the commonsense psychology invoked 
by the state.11 Conceiving of persons as “equal” is typically treated as a corollary of conceiving of 
persons as free: Persons are equal inasmuch as they have the capacity to possess the natural properties 
that allow for a commonsense psychological understanding of their culpable behavior.”12 
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Positivist Criminology and Materialism  
 
Positivism developed in the late nineteenth century, responding to many of the basic tenets of the 
classical school. One of the central components of positivist criminology is the goal of furthering 
“scientific” approaches that treat criminal activity as a social phenomenon. Unlike the classical school, 
then, positivist criminology downplays the significance of free will to criminal behavior. Positivism 
instead emphasized the relationship between biological, psychological, economic, and social forces and 
a person’s propensity to engage in criminal acts. Early positivist criminology manifested itself in a 
variety of ways by a variety of theorists. Adolphe Quetelet argued that crime had biological and societal 
causes based upon three broad categories: accidental (e.g., wars, famines), variable (e.g., personality), 
and constant (e.g., age, gender, occupation), while Cesare Lombroso’s notorious work includes theories 
of the “born criminal.”13 Of course, positivism evolved into more rigorous methods of quantitative 
science that has occupied much of twentieth- century criminology. As we will see, the “Chicago School” 
was a manifestation of positivism that examined how externalities (social organization) affected 
personality (or the what might be described as the “self”). It is here that we find surprising connections 
to Hobbes. 
 
The Convergence of Rational and Material Agency in Hobbes 
 
There are several broad insights regarding the relationship between Hobbesian agency and materialism 
in Sharron’s Lloyd’s illuminating work. Her Ideals as Interests in Hobbes’s Leviathan reorients and 
embeds Hobbes’s conception of human nature and personal identity historically – within religion, 
politics, and education, for example.14 In other words, the idea is that Hobbes sets forth an empirical 
conception of social disorder rather than a simplistic conception based merely upon natural philosophy. 
Lloyd writes: “Hobbes took social disorder to be primarily the result of actions on transcendent interest 
[... that are] systematically disruptive.” These interests – such as religious interests – lead to disorder 
and are the result of “actual existing social practice.”15 Accordingly, a central facet of Lloyd’s argument 
is that Hobbesian human nature is in large part based upon sociological questions and concerns.16 
Already, then, we can begin to see how Hobbesian criminology might be reoriented toward positivism. 
Answers to social disorder thus have less to do with crudely conceived notions of an isolated “self,” 
and more to do with deconfliction of transcendent social interests through education and a principle of 
political obligation.17 This highlights the balancing role of rationality, with Lloyd suggesting that 
Leviathan is in large part about addressing social disorder by providing reasons (such as prudential, 
moral, and religious reasons) for political obligation.18  
 Lloyd’s Morality in the Philosophy of Thomas Hobbes complements many of these themes, setting 
forth what she describes as the “reciprocity theory of reason” for political obligation.19 The basic idea 
yields an interpretation of what it means to be a rational animal, namely: beings who act on practical 
reasons.20 According to Lloyd, the basis of such reasons is whether (1) the reason would serve as a 
reason for the actions of others, and (2) the actual attitudes of agents.21 For present purposes, the take-
away from Lloyd’s interpretation is the idea that rational agents desire to justify themselves to others – 
a social component of human psychology – in their pursuit of transcendental concerns and social order. 
 Variations of these themes are apparent in more recent work regarding the relationship between 
Hobbesian agency and materialism. Arash Abizadeh suggests that Hobbes’s conception of voluntary 
action is not merely a limited cognitive process, but also includes linguistic reasoning. The upshot is 
that Hobbes’s account of agency emphasizes a connection – through linguistic reasoning – between 
materialist determinism and a cognitive conception of deliberation and voluntary action.22 In other 
words, there is a robust convergence of the rational and the material for Hobbes. As Abizadeh puts it, 
Hobbes’s goal is “to provide a materialist, determinist account of reasoning, reason-responsive agency, 
and voluntary action that, by appealing to the artifice of language, bypasses any appeal to an incorporeal 
will or intellect and relies instead on the same faculty by which we perceive, imagine, and remember.”23 
This suggests the causal component in Hobbes’s theory, which I give a more detailed treatment in the 
next section. Here, though, note how Abizadeh describes Hobbes as developing his materialist, 
determinist account of reasoning “by characterizing responding to reasons as a causally determined 
activity in which agents form beliefs on the basis of rules for inference embedded in linguistic 
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conventions.”24 This line of thought will ultimately help support an interpretation of Hobbesian 
criminology evoking positivism.  
 In a similar way, Sandra Field has described a Hobbesian science of politics based upon a conception 
of persons as material bodies subject to mechanical forces that is compatible with a conception of 
persons as moral subjects who appeal to reason.25 Field’s focus is the materialist prong of Hobbes’s 
project. She suggests that if a Hobbesian science of politics entails agents who appeal to reason, “it 
must be compatible with the analysis of human beings as potentially irrational material bodies […] in a 
web of causal relations […].”26 Like Field, I draw out support for this line of thought in the context of 
both Leviathan and De Corpore in the next section. The hope is that this will help lay the groundwork 
for a socially embedded, casuist version of Hobbesian criminology. Interestingly, we will see how this 
account of Hobbesian criminology shares some aspects with contemporary liberal theory, while 
departing from strictly rationalistic interpretations.  
  
Hobbesian Causation 
 
As was seen from Abizedah and others, Hobbes’s materialism shapes his account of deliberation. More 
broadly, the Hobbesian account of the metaphysics of causation serves as a basis of a unified 
philosophical project that yields a conception of the self that is intertwined in a web of externalities. 
This is apparent in several key passages from Leviathan, which suggest a bridge between Hobbes’s 
natural philosophy and his political philosophy. These passages focus upon the related concepts of 
liberty, power, necessity, and freedom.  Although the way that Hobbes uses these concepts to connect 
natural and political philosophy is important, the focus in this section is upon the way his determinism 
intricately connects one to one’s environment and others. This notion is reaffirmed by Hobbes’s 
taxonomy of causation in De Corpore, particularly regarding the relationship between agents and 
patients and the implications of that relationship.27 Ultimately, these texts help show that what is rational 
in human behavior is shaped by the material and social context. As we will see, the upshot is a synthetic 
middle point between the classical and the positivist schools of criminology. 
 
Causal Chains in Leviathan 
 
There are several places in Hobbes’s systematic project at which one might identify a connection 
between natural and political philosophy. One of the more obvious jumping-off points is Hobbes’s 
argument regarding liberty in Chapter 21 of the Leviathan. Hobbes treats the terms “liberty” and 
“freedom” synonymously here, with each meaning the absence of external impediments of motion. 
Hobbes makes use of this conception of liberty strictly, applying it to rational, irrational, and inanimate 
things alike. Under the narrow framework of external impediments of motion, then, a person, a snail, 
and a rock may all possess liberty. However, Hobbes does distinguish external and internal 
impediments of motion. While the former relates to a thing’s lack of liberty, the latter relates to a thing’s 
lack of power. This means that the impediment of motion is derived from the thing itself: a stone at rest 
lacks the power to move, as does one who is confined to bed because of sickness. These examples of 
internal impediments nevertheless reinforce Hobbes’s strict materialism. Although they are deemed 
internal impediments, they continue to focus exclusively on a thing’s motion rather than some sort of 
internal psychology or weakness of the will.  
 Indeed, Hobbes argues that it is incorrect to apply terms such as “liberty” and “free” to anything 
other than bodies because only bodies are subject to motions and impediments of motion; moreover, 
we cannot conceive of the existence of anything that is not body.28 Describing a free will is thus 
nonsensical for Hobbes; instead, we may only describe a free man: “He, that in those things, which by 
his strength and wit he is able to do, is not hindered to do what he has a will to.”29 Tying together natural 
philosophy and political philosophy in this way has dramatic implications, of course. For instance, 
Hobbes must acknowledge that one acts with liberty even if one’s act is performed out of fear, 
illustrating this point with the famous example of a man who is forced to throw his goods overboard in 
order to save his ship from sinking. Such a man acts with freedom and liberty because nothing impedes 
his action of throwing the goods overboard.30 This rigidity in Hobbes’s stance on liberty raises obvious 
questions regarding one’s political liberty, freedom, and consent to political obligations in a political 
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society.31 Although describing liberty as freedom of motion does not seem to be a complete conception 
of what it means to have liberty in a political context, Hobbes fills in this conception in other ways. 
 The above points present a strong materialistic connection between Hobbes’s natural philosophy and 
political philosophy. More importantly, they lay the groundwork for Hobbes’s view that liberty and 
necessity are compatible, and it is the nature of this compatibility that points toward the notion that 
Hobbes’s conception of the self is uniquely interconnected to externalities. Hobbes first argues that 
one’s voluntary actions proceed from liberty because they proceed from one’s will. He then introduces 
the idea of necessity: “every act of man’s will, and every desire, and inclination proceedeth from some 
cause, and that from another cause, in a continual chain, (whose first link is in the hand of God the first 
of all causes).”32 This picture of necessity suggests that one is inextricably intertwined with the 
multitude of things that determine not only one’s every action, but also one’s every inclination and 
desire. Although one’s voluntary actions and inclinations may proceed from liberty and one’s will, they 
also each result from a complex web of causes. Neither this web of causation nor the necessity of our 
actions is apparent to us.33 Such an account of causation raises basic questions for Hobbes regarding the 
compatibility of liberty and necessity. This issue will come up again in the next section, but for now the 
important point is the internal-external interdependence that Hobbes ascribes to the self.  
 Consider the conception of voluntary motion introduced above. In Chapter 6, Hobbes describes two 
sorts of motion in a person. The first sort includes involuntary bodily functions, such as breathing. The 
second is voluntary motion, which includes speaking and moving one’s body in the way the mind 
desires. Although a person’s voluntary actions may be the result of a series of elaborate causal chains, 
the initial cause of voluntary motion is something internal within a person, namely, the imagination: 
“And because going, speaking, and the like Voluntary motions, depend always upon a precedent thought 
of whither, which way, and what; it is evident, that the Imagination is the first internall beginning of all 
Voluntary Motion.”34 Establishing imagination as the initial internal cause of voluntary motion means 
that the Hobbesian self is not static, but rather dynamic and in constant flux due to its engagement with 
the environment: “Because the constitution of a mans Body, is in continuall mutations; it is impossible 
that all the same things should always cause in him the same Appetites, and Aversions.”35  
 As seen from the preceding passages, the imagination is the initial cause of voluntary motion, but 
the imagination may be prompted by external causes. Hobbes calls the internal beginnings of voluntary 
motion appetite when those internal beginnings are directed toward an external cause. While some 
appetites are innate (e.g., the desire for food), many are the result of particular experiences; these 
experiences are of course diverse and affect one’s appetite accordingly. It is here that one can begin to 
see the interconnection between a person’s internal and external causal chains. Although causal chains 
are never fully internal (they are determined by externalities), there is a dynamic interplay between 
one’s imagination and one’s environment. Against the backdrop of Hobbes’s determinism, then, the 
self is in a perpetual evolution as a result of the complexity of both the external and internal causal 
chains in play. The picture Hobbes presents is that the self may not be detached from people, 
institutions, practices, and so on, that make up the external causes that inevitably act upon and shape 
one’s internal constitution. The final pages of Part II (Of Common-wealth) in the Leviathan, make the 
point succinctly: “There is no action of man in this life, that is not the beginning of so long a chain of 
Consequences, as no humane Providence, is high enough, to give a man a prospect to the end.”36 
 
Agents and Patients in De Corpore 
 
Hobbes’s analysis of cause and effect in De Corpore – particularly his account of the relationship 
between agents and patients – expands upon the notion developed in Leviathan that the self is intimately 
tied to externalities. It is important to first clarify the structure Hobbes uses in his treatment of causation. 
Bodies act on other bodies when they do something to other bodies, such as when Body 1 encounters 
Body 2 and generates motion in Body 2. Such action thus involves two concepts: Body 1 is the agent 
because it generates motion in Body 2, and Body 2 is the patient because it is the body in which motion 
is generated by Body 1. The motion generated in Body 2 is the effect. However, Hobbes does not 
describe the cause of such effects in terms simply of the agent, but rather in terms of particular accidents 
that are unique to both the agent and patient involved in a cause and effect relationship. In other words, 
there are innumerable factors – or accidents – that are requisite in both the agent and the patient in order 
for any particular effect to occur (causa sine qua non).37 The “entire cause”, then, consists of all the 
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accidents in both the agent (efficient cause) and the patient (material cause), and the upshot is that when 
all accidents are present “it cannot be understood but that the effect is produced at the same instant; and 
if any one of them be wanting, it cannot be understood by that the effect is not produced.”38 This point 
especially helps show how external contingencies play a necessary role in determining the self. In a 
sense, then, a conception of the self that is detached from external contingences is at odds with Hobbes’s 
metaphysics.  
 Finally, let us consider Hobbes’s notion of necessary causes in De Corpore. Recall that in the 
Leviathan Hobbes’s view of necessity means that one is intertwined with a multitude of externalities 
that set the course for one’s actions, inclinations, and desires. In other words, one’s voluntary actions 
and inclinations proceed from the will, which is determined by a web of causes beginning with God. 
Hobbes’s account of necessary causes in De Corpore provides additional support for the compatibility 
between liberty and necessity. Building upon the above account of entire causes, Hobbes argues that an 
effect is produced in the same instant a cause is entire. Therefore, a necessary cause is a cause that must 
be followed by the relevant effect.  So, again, all effects occur necessarily because they are derived 
from an entire – and thus necessary – cause. Importantly, however, Hobbes describes this notion of 
cause and effect as a perpetual evolution between agents and patients: “There is a continual mutation in 
the agent or agents, by the working of other agents upon them, so also the patient, upon which they 
work, is continually altered and changed.”39 Here again we see the complex – and necessary – interplay 
between agents and patients, bodies and externalities. For Hobbes, then, it is sufficient to say that one 
acts with liberty if one is not impeded from voluntary action. The fact that these actions are intricately 
tied to a web of necessary internal and external causes is not problematic, but rather a natural result of 
the way Hobbes views one’s connection to the world.40 
 One can glean a few important points from this sketch of Hobbes’s account of the metaphysics of 
causation. First, there is seemingly a bridge between Hobbes’s natural philosophy and his political 
philosophy, particularly in the context of liberty and necessity. To be sure, it is common (though not 
uncontroversial) to say that Hobbes was engaged in a systematic project of deriving the principles of 
political philosophy from those of natural philosophy. For example, David Gauthier described Hobbes’s 
approach to achieving a unified science as follows: “We resolve, or as Hobbes often prefers to say, 
analyze a whole – a watch, or a commonwealth – into its constituent parts, discovering the relations 
among the parts, which then enable us to recompose or synthesize the whole.”41 So while this 
interpretation of Hobbes is not unique, the actual theory put forth by Hobbes is. Linking natural 
philosophy and political philosophy is a decidedly novel approach that requires a decidedly large 
commitment from Hobbes. In many ways, his natural philosophy and his political philosophy stand and 
fall together because they are two parts of a bigger whole.42 One may not detach fundamental aspects 
of Hobbes’s conception of the self without compromising Hobbes’s entire project. As a systematic, 
unified project, one must take Hobbes’s conception of the self as it is the world, namely, inextricably 
intertwined in the web of externalities that form the basis of his theory of causal determinism. In De 
Corpore, this account is affirmed by the interplay between agents and patients. And though this account 
of the self may not always be as obvious in his representational device – the state of nature – it is no 
less relevant. The next section examines how this account of causation is at odds with many aspects of 
an individualistic strand of liberalism, while remaining consistent in unexpected ways. 
 
 
 
Determinism and the Self in Hobbes’s Political Theory: A Path to Positivist Criminology 
 
In light of the many interpretative threads noted in the literature (Abizedah, Field, Frost, Lloyd, and so 
on), one can draw a broad conclusion about the relationship between Hobbesian agency and causation 
in his natural philosophy: rational autonomy and determinism are not polar opposites. To say that 
Hobbes is a determinist is not to say that a lack of freedom equates to a lack of autonomy. This is 
because freedom and necessity are in a sense bound together. Accordingly, it is in a sense more apt to 
describe the Hobbesian self through the idea of heteronomy. In other words, the Hobbesian self develops 
and becomes manifest through complex webs of causation – influences outside the self. The upshot is 
a socially embedded self that shares attributes of a more casuist version of Rawls – rather than a strictly 
rational, proto-classical criminologist.  
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 There are several examples that help draw out these points.  For example, Hobbes’s state of nature 
does not yield a conception of the self that is a bare subject from whom the multitude of external 
influences may be stripped, leaving behind a clear picture of a subject concerned with self-interest 
solely. This is of course different from various forms of contemporary liberalism, including some 
interpretations of liberalism associated with Rawlsian political philosophy. However, while Hobbes’s 
theory suggests a more collective and social conception of the self, it retains similarities to liberalism 
that are drawn out in the work of Lloyd, Frost, and others. And this conception of the self helps establish 
a connection to the positivist school of criminology 
 
The Condition of Mere Nature  
 
In Leviathan, the aim of Hobbes’s political philosophy project is to provide an account of a secure 
society for individuals, “the conservation of Peace and justice, the end for which all Common-wealths 
are Instituted.”43 His technique for providing such an account has by now become a paradigm of 
political philosophy. In order to get his theory off the ground, Hobbes’s uses a hypothetical device – 
the state of nature – to show how and why individuals would form a civil society. Although he is clear 
that it is a hypothetical device (“there had never been any time, wherein particular men were in a 
condition of warre one against one another”), it is important to note that Hobbes does indeed compare 
the state of nature to actual places with actual people: “there are many places, where they live so now 
[...] the savage peoples in many places in America, except the government of small Families, the 
concord whereof dependeth on natural lust, have no government at all; and live at this day in the brutish 
manner, as I said before.”44 This is an important point because it at least minimally anchors Hobbes’s 
state of nature to the actual world, and it thus anchors the hypothetical individuals in the state of nature 
to actual individuals in the actual world. In other words, Hobbes’s account of the abstract individuals 
who inhabit the state of nature is not necessarily as abstract as one might think; instead, they are 
comparable to actual people who inhabit actual places.  
 Although Hobbes famously describes one in the state of nature as living in “continuall feare, and 
danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, brutish, and short,” he does not 
suggest that we must imagine an abstract conception of the self, unencumbered by external influences, 
in order to derive the principles of society.45 Indeed, Hobbes specifically mentions the existence of 
common ties, influences, and obligations, in the state of nature, namely, those that are familial and 
sexual in nature. It is by no means clear, then, that we are to imagine the self in Hobbes’s state of nature 
in a wholly detached, individualist manner.46 Instead, the most we can say is that Hobbes’s state of 
nature is a very unpleasant place, one in which people not unlike ourselves would be motivated to form 
a civil society.   
 In addition to familial connections, religious ties prevent the Hobbesian self in the state of nature 
from being conceived as an abstractly individualistic conception. In Chapter 10 of Leviathan, Hobbes 
notes several ways in which one may honor another, all of which are available without the existence of 
a commonwealth.47 Shortly thereafter, in Chapter 12, Hobbes expands upon this theme by describing 
religion as something inherent in the self: “the first seeds [of religion ... ] can never be so abolished out 
of human nature, but that new Religions may againe be made to spring out of them, by the culture of 
such men, as for such purpose are in reputation.”48 So while new religions may develop from the culture 
of a civil society, religion is a part of Hobbes’s state of nature; presumably, it is something that one 
embraces or rejects according to the causal chains that shape the self. Hobbes develops the point more 
explicitly in Chapter 14, where he describes how religion can elicit fear in one even if no civil society 
exists: “The Feare of [… God] is in every man, his own Religion: which hath place in the nature of man 
before Civill Society.”49 Familial and religious ties cannot be sensibly detached from the self, neither 
in a hypothetical state of nature nor in other contexts.  
 This makes sense considering his views on causation discussed earlier. A person is tied to complex 
causal chains, both internal and external, that form the basis of the self. It would thus seem odd to 
characterize the Hobbesian conception of the self in the state of nature as a freestanding, individualist 
ideal that may be abstracted away from externalities. In one sense, this is because such externalities are 
constitutive of the self in that they determine one’s will. Jurgen Overhoff has made a similar point, 
noting that for Hobbes the “motions of external objects working on our nerves and brain [...] produce 
conceptions or motion in some internal substance of the head.”50 In other words, one is unable to engage 
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one’s will without those necessary externalities. And this means that one cannot abstract away the 
history of the self because that history determines what the self is at any given moment.  
 Nevertheless, Hobbes’s use of the state of nature to develop his political philosophy bears many 
obvious resemblances to the liberal individualism of contemporary political philosophy, particularly 
Rawls’s use of the original position. This can be illustrated with a few brief examples, which also help 
draw out how the crucial differences are in the details. Consider how Rawls describes his aim in the 
opening pages of A Theory of Justice: “to present a conception of justice which generalizes and carries 
to a higher level of abstraction the familiar theory of the social contract.”51 Although he does not refer 
to Hobbes as one of the sources for this tradition (he does refer to Locke, Rousseau, and Kant), Rawls’s 
hypothetical device for establishing the principles of justice – the original position – is of course 
explicitly based upon the state of nature: “the original position of equality corresponds to the state of 
nature in the traditional theory of the social contract.”52 The hypothetical original position is thus 
designed to replicate the state of nature so that one may derive the principles of justice that would be 
selected as the basis of civil society. The parties in the original position are famously situated behind a 
veil of ignorance so that the principles of justice are based on fairness, rather than attributes that are the 
result of “natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances.”53 This point is crucial because 
Rawls is far more explicit regarding what he detaches from the self in the original position.54  
 What this means is that one of the predominant, contemporary, liberal conceptions of the self is in a 
sense at odds with the conception of the self in Hobbes’s hypothetical state of nature. This is because 
the self in Rawls’s original position would for Hobbes be too detached from externalities to justify the 
output of the original position. In other words, to conceive of the self – even in a representational device 
such as the original position – abstracted away from the causal chains that necessarily determine one’s 
will would leave behind a self that was incapable of willing the output (the principles of justice) of the 
original position. Now, this does not mean that it would have been impossible for Hobbes to 
conceptualize a representational device such as the veil of ignorance. To be sure, Hobbes’s mechanical 
conception of the self does not rule out the possibility of counterfactual accounts of one’s choices and 
how those choices might have affected one differently. The point is a much less controversial claim 
about the Hobbesian self. Although it is certainly possible to conceive of a Hobbesian self without 
conceiving of all the particular external causal chains (one would be unaware of many such chains and 
their causal role), it is not altogether sensible to abstract away all such chains because they are 
fundamental in determining the will and the self. To do so would mean that it would be unclear exactly 
what Hobbsian self one was conceiving of because there would exist no persisting, stable, atomistic 
ideal. Moreover, Hobbes’s larger, systematic project would be severely weakened in that there would 
no longer be a consistent, scientific account of the self that is intertwined with complex internal and 
external causal chains. 
 That said, the ultimate goals of Hobbesian and contemporary political philosophy are undoubtedly 
similar in many ways. For example, Rawls cites Leviathan as containing the thesis behind his notion 
that a coercive sovereign is necessary because “the existence of effective penal machinery serves as 
men’s security to one another.”55 More generally, Richard Tuck’s recent chapter, “Hobbes and 
democracy,” positions Hobbes’s political theory as a forerunner of democratic political ideals.56 These 
ideals – which might include equal natural rights and liberties and an account of civil society that 
invokes hypothetical devices – place Hobbes unmistakably in the liberal tradition. But while the big 
picture may be similar, the details of the hypothetical parties that yield an account of civil society remain 
inconsistent in many ways.   
 To suggest, for instance, that both the state of nature and the original position rely upon the judgment 
of individuals who are presumed not to know many facts about themselves and their actual circumstance 
(such as religion) would be at odds with what we have seen in Leviathan.57 Familial and religious ties, 
conceptions of honor, and a generally complex interplay between a subject and his world are all present 
in Hobbes’s state of nature – a hypothetical device populated by hypothetical representatives that 
Hobbes nonetheless compares to actual people and places. Although this is perhaps a minor point when 
viewed in isolation, it is more significant when considering how it shows that Hobbes’s state of nature 
is far from a carbon copy of contemporary conceptions (especially Rawls’s original position behind the 
veil of ignorance). For example, interpretations that view the Hobbesian self as more isolated from 
externalities strike a fatal blow to Hobbes’s larger, systematic project, which includes a scientific 
account of the self that is intertwined with complex internal and external causal chains. In short, while 
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Hobbes’s state of nature shares some similarities with representational devices such as the original 
position, it seems clear that Hobbes does not intend to detach externalities from the self in a 
contemporary, Rawlsian way. Instead, the vivid descriptions of the state of nature (“solitary, poore, 
nasty, brutish, and short”) seem to be more about rhetorical flare—a richly suggestive metaphor 
regarding the necessity of a sovereign. 
 
Transcendent Interests, Criminology, and the Hobbesian Self  
 
Recall the earlier discussion of “transcendent interests” in Lloyd’s work – especially how Lloyd 
suggests that social disorder is a result of such interests. These are socially embedded interests (religion, 
for example), which are so important to one’s self identity that one would sacrifice more basic interests 
(such as personal safety). And this may result in social disorder, lending support to the view that 
Hobbesian criminology should in part be viewed through the lens of positivism’s social framework  The 
upshot is that Hobbesian criminology includes the connection between social disorder and socially 
embedded interests – not a simplistic notion of rational agents focused on mere self-preservation by 
avoiding state punishment. The Hobbesian self is much more complex given the role of transcendent 
interests articulated in Lloyd’s work. Coupled with Hobbes’s natural philosophy, the self is a conflux 
of social chains that include religion, education, rationality, and so on – all of which contribute to 
transcendent interests and social disorder. Hobbes’s natural philosophy is thus the anchor that yields a 
conception of the self that is prescient with respect to positivistic criminology. And it is a compatibilist 
theory in which the determinism of the natural philosophy does not negate one’s agency.  
 This interpretation stands to reason inasmuch as positivism implies that the self is defined by a 
multitude of collective and communal connections, without which it would be no longer possible to 
conceive of a particular self. The connection to Hobbesian causation is apparent given that we have 
seen how Hobbes suggests a self that is defined by communal, familial, religious, and other externalities 
that may not be detached from a subject. The first thing that one may take away from this conclusion is 
that Hobbes’s conception of the self is less in line with an individualistic conception prominent in some 
variations of liberalism.58 In any event, Hobbes’s conception of the self in the state of nature is 
consistent with the conception of the self yielded from his view on causation, and that conception is at 
odds with an exceedingly individualistic conception.59   
 A related conclusion can be drawn with respect to the prior discussion of Hobbes’s determinism in 
Leviathan, namely: the self continually changes because of a complex array of external and internal 
causal chains that are perpetually at play; there is no atomistic self that persists through the perpetual 
flux.60 This prevents the self from being detached from the people, institutions, practices, and so on, 
which form (via causal chains) one’s internal constitution. Indeed, for Hobbes, there is no act in one’s 
life that is not in some way connected to other things. Frost draws out this sentiment as follows: 
 
According to [… Hobbes’s] materialism, a subject’s sense of self, and his or her patterns of 
desire and thinking, are not ever wholly his or her own. They are not autogenetic, autonomic 
phenomena. Rather, individuals’ subjective self-identity, their thoughts, and their desires are 
constituted and modified by their ongoing encounter and engagement with one another and with 
the world.61 
 
In other words, Hobbesian causation ties the self to others (and to other externalities) fundamentally, 
and the self would be inconceivable without such ties. Frost rightly contrasts this conception of the self 
with “the philosophically conjured rational wills who compose Kant’s postulated moral community.”62 
Unlike the liberal tradition represented by Kant and Rawls (and the tradition in which Hobbes’s political 
theory is sometimes placed without context), then, the interaction between persons in Hobbes’s civil 
society and state of nature are not abstract dealings that are driven by “the intellectual manipulation and 
consideration of rational principle.”63 Rather, they are driven by externalities to which the self is 
inextricably intertwined through innumerable causal chains.   
 A similar picture is available when returning to De Corpore, where Hobbes describes cause and 
effect as continuous interaction between agents and patients. Importantly, he says that when an agent 
and patient are not contiguous (i.e., when another body lies between them), the body between the agent 
and patient “is then itself both an agent and a patient; an agent in respect of the body next after it, upon 
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which it works, and a patient in respect of the body next before it, from which it suffers.”64 Frost seizes 
upon this passage to make the point that for Hobbes specific acts are not to be viewed “in terms of their 
immediate causes and immediate intended effects but rather in terms of the chains of causal antecedents 
as well as the ‘long chaynes of consequences’ that continue to unfold after a particular act can be said 
to have taken place.”65 Lisa Sarasohn has taken a similar position, arguing that for Hobbes “neither the 
‘animal spirits,’ the brain, the soul, the appetite, nor the will have any original principle of motion. They 
are completely passive and act only in response to the impact of external agents.”66 The upshot of this 
point is crucial: an “agent simpliciter” is inconceivable because an agent in the world is also a patient 
in the world, and each is influenced continuously by a vast array of causal chains.67 
 The long and short of it is that the liberal conception of a bare self that imposes its pure will on the 
world seems inconceivable for Hobbes because all bodies act necessarily as both agents and patients 
via complex causal chains. Another way to put the point is in terms of interconnectedness. One’s self 
forms a part of a collective and one’s self is unavoidably interconnected with the various other parts of 
the collective in which one finds oneself.68 This means that for Hobbes the individual may not be 
thought of as forging a course through the world solitarily: The individual may “act only to the degree 
that the extant passive powers or social conditions allow.”69 In other words, we are encumbered by the 
collective for better or for worse.  
 Again, then, we can see how Hobbes is closer to the positivist school of criminology that previously 
considered. Of course, this does not mean that all his connections to the classical school have suddenly 
vanished. The point is rather that his association with various theories of criminology should be more 
nuanced. The claim is not particularly controversial when considering how the positivist school began 
as an attempt to provide more “scientific” explanations of crime – including the many social and 
psychological forces that explain a person’s path to crime. The positivist school had many infamous 
false starts,70 but consider just one of the movement’s more lasting contributions: the so-called “Chicago 
School.”  
 In the early 1920s, the burgeoning Department of Sociology at the University of Chicago began to 
view the city of Chicago as its “field” for the study of human relationships.71 One of the central issues 
on which the department focused was how social processes determined the extent to which racial and 
ethnic groups assimilated into society broadly.72 Somewhat related was the department’s development 
of the idea of “human ecology,” which reduced the city to distinct communities and cultures that 
developed around societal and other barriers.73 One of the key contributions of this work was the 
application of concentric zones to these ecological communities. This resulted in studies showing that 
delinquency rates declined as one moved from the city’s center to the city’s outlying zones.74 And this 
led to other studies regarding the nature and impact of living in a particular ecological area, including, 
for example, the different family types in different zones.75 In terms of methodology, “[e]cological 
studies consisted of making spot maps of Chicago for the place of occurrence of specific behaviors, 
including alcoholism, homicides, suicides, psychoses, and poverty, and then computing rates based on 
census data.”76 The source of crime was thus external, not internal. 
 In other words, the result of the Chicago School was a series of theories focusing on how externalities 
(social organization) affected personality (or the what might be described as the “self”). Admittedly, 
the connections between this example of a positivist school of criminology and Hobbesian theory are 
only suggestive, as there has clearly been no attempt to provide a thorough accounting of every twist 
and turn of the Chicago (or any other) School. The point is rather to sketch some of the broad similarities 
that have hitherto gone unnoticed and that might be worth exploring in future work. And at least one 
conclusion is clear: Hobbes’s political theory entails a more complex conception of the self than 
typically assumed, and that conception results in a more nuanced conclusion about how his political 
theory relates to criminological theory. The metaphysical underpinnings of both his natural and political 
philosophy downplay the notion of a purely individualistic conception of the self that is governed solely 
by volition, instead pointing to a more positivist theory of criminology 
 A final observation worth emphasizing is the ways that Hobbes’s determinism is consistent with the 
liberal tradition – particularly with respect to criminal justice – despite the differences that have been 
noted. Rawlsian liberalism is a representative example. Rawls famously argued that one does not 
deserve one’s starting place in society, nor one’s good or bad character, because those things are 
determined by externalities over which one has no control.77 Although Rawls does not set this view 
against the backdrop of determinism explicitly, the similarity to Hobbes is unmistakable.  In certain 
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respects, Rawls’s conception implies that every aspect of a person is determined by externalities, 
perhaps in a way similar to the causal chains that are crucial in determining the Hobbesian self. In his 
well-known critique of this view, Robert Nozick characterized the liberal conception of the self as 
follows: “This [Rawlsian] line of argument can succeed in blocking the introduction of a person’s 
autonomous choices and actions (and their results) only by attributing everything noteworthy about the 
person completely to certain ‘external’ factors.”78 Although one may take issue with Nozick’s critique 
of Rawlsian liberalism, it is uncontroversial to say that Rawlsian liberalism generally views one’s 
natural attributes and starting place in society to be determined by externalities beyond the self.   
 In a sense, then, Rawls does provide a robust account of how social context influences the 
development of the liberal subject: Although the original position is a highly abstract device designed 
to represent a highly abstract conception of the self, Rawls rounds out this conception of the self (the 
output of the original position) by focusing closely on the myriad of external factors that are vital to the 
formation of the self. This means that Rawls’s notion of desert is in many ways similar to Hobbes’s, 
particularly in the context of criminal liability. For instance, Hobbes’s view on punishment is informed 
by an understanding of the casual chains that lead to a particular crime. Hobbes acknowledges many 
circumstances that may mitigate one’s liability under the law, and he even says that certain 
circumstances preclude one’s obligation to obey the law, such that if an “accident […] hath taken away 
the means to take notice of any particular Law [... then] that Law is no Law to him.”79 In short, Hobbes’s 
casuist perspective is roughly analogous to a liberal conception of desert in that the causal chains and 
externalities that influence one’s actions may mitigate one’s responsibility.80 In spite of their profound 
differences, then, it is of course important to acknowledge the many connections between the Hobbesian 
political tradition and certain aspects of the contemporary liberal tradition. This is particularly true of 
those connections that are found in the context of Hobbes’s determinism, which lurks just beneath the 
surface of his political theory.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Hobbes bridges natural philosophy and political philosophy in the Leviathan, particularly with respect 
to determinism’s role in connecting a person to externalities. This notion is reaffirmed in De Corpore, 
where Hobbes sets forth the relationship between agents and patients. However, less attention has been 
paid to how this relationship provides a more complex conception of the Hobbesian self than typically 
assumed. Hobbes’s state of nature does not yield a conception of the self that is a bare subject from 
whom the multitude of external influences may be stripped. This means that Hobbes’s conception of 
the self may be distinguished in new ways from liberal conceptions, especially the individualist strand 
of liberalism associated with many contemporary accounts. It further shows the novel ways that 
Hobbes’s conception of the self is socially embedded, while retaining similarities to liberalism as it 
relates to desert and criminal justice. These points are supported by two central observations: First, 
Hobbes’s determinism opposes a conception of the self from which one may detach all externalities 
because those externalities necessarily determine the will and what the self is at any given moment. 
Second, there is no stable conception of the self that persists because the externalities at play on a subject 
keep the self in a constant state of flux.   
 The result is a more nuanced conclusion about how Hobbes’s metaphysical theory relates to 
criminological theory. There is no doubt that Hobbes retains a prominent place as a forerunner of the 
classical school, which relies upon the presumption that persons are rational, free, and self-interested.  
Many aspects of Hobbes’s political philosophy lend clear support for this view, helping explain how 
the threat of punishment can deter criminal behavior in persons. However, the metaphysical 
underpinnings of both his natural and political philosophy clearly downplay the notion of a purely 
individualistic conception of the self that is governed solely by volition. Rather, a fuller picture of 
Hobbes’s philosophy shows how a variety of social and psychological forces relate to one’s actions – 
including actions that lead to crime. Taking a step back, one can see how Hobbes’s position on causation 
illuminates a more complex view of the self that is associated with positivist criminology. Indeed, his 
theory is especially prescient with respect to twentieth-century variants of positivism that focus upon 
the connections between social organization and personality. In a sense, then, modern criminological 
theory is indebted to Hobbes’s focus upon the connections between externalities and the self – which 
perhaps illuminates new ways of viewing responsibility and accountability. 
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